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International law, political science and economics scholars are all concerned with analyzing the 
performance of the WTO as an organization. In this paper we focus on the objectives that these 
different disciplines attribute to the WTO and how performance is assessed against these objectives. 
The literature in all three fields is vibrant, but the focus of each discipline is often on very different 
dimensions of WTO performance. While this implies significant complementarity across disciplines it 
also suggests potential opportunity costs in foregone synergies. Even when similar phenomena are the 
focus of analysis, different concepts, connotations and labels makes cross-disciplinary debate less 
efficient or prohibits it altogether. Greater effort to promote cross-fertilization across disciplines would 
enrich and strengthen research on the performance of the WTO. 
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A. Introduction* 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) officially opened its doors in 1995 at the shores of Lake 
Geneva. Although it is one of the youngest major international governmental organizations, the WTO 
built upon customs, principles and rules that developed over nearly half a century under the loosely 
institutionalized platform of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Notwithstanding 
its short history, in the past 20 years the organization has generated significant attention from various 
segments of society in both developed and developing countries and has attracted 33 new members, 
transforming into a nearly universal organization. It has also become the focus of extensive academic 
research spanning a number of disciplines, most notably international economics, international law 
and international relations. While most experts would argue that the WTO matters and research has 
focused on a variety of WTO-related achievements, there are conceptual and empirical holes in WTO 
scholarship. In particular, significant scope exists to do more to pursue inter-disciplinary research – 
much of the scholarly literature is limited to specific disciplinary “silos”. One reflection of this is that 
the questions that are analyzed by economists, legal scholars and political scientists differ 
significantly. While this makes research on the WTO complementary, it also implies there are 
unexploited opportunities for synergies.  
This paper focuses on WTO outputs and outcomes by drawing on concepts that measure the 
performance of the organization providing different disciplinary narratives from international 
relations, economics and law. These debates have often occurred in isolation of each other. A key 
objective is to seek further cross-fertilization across disciplines. What we find is that depending on the 
performance matrix used (the ‘eye of the beholder’) the assessment of how the WTO matters 
(performance) can vary significantly. This has implications not just for research and research 
programmes looking forward, but is important from an accountability and “ownership” perspective. 
Governments have found it increasingly challenging to explain why they negotiate trade agreements 
and what the impacts of trade agreements have been. This is a challenge that applies to both 
preferential and multilateral trade agreements (the WTO) – indeed, one consequence of the “lack of 
coherence” in approaches to assessing the impacts of trade agreements is that it makes it more difficult 
to understand the rationales for, and effects of, different types of trade agreements that are pursued by 
WTO Members and the critical policy question where the WTO has a comparative advantage or can 
add most value in the pursuit of a given objective.  
B. How to think about performance 
As a basic understanding, one could define performance as achieving agreed-upon objectives (Gutner 
and Thompson 2010). In this context three key questions arise.  
First, what is to be achieved? Gutner and Thompson (2010) differentiate between macro objectives 
which are ambitious goals, intermediate outcomes and more narrow or process-related tasks within 
international organizations. As we move from specific tasks to high-impact objectives achieving the 
set baseline becomes more difficult. Also, in reality, set goals might be imprecise or worse ambiguous. 
Therefore the extent to which objectives are well defined affects the overall analysis. An important 
qualification here is that members of international organizations might disagree on the purpose and 
therefore the expected tasks to be performed. This has been described as an “eye of the beholder 
problem”. While trade liberalization might be a key objective for one WTO member, another member 
might push for constraining the ability of a large player like the United States from using trade policy 
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instruments unilaterally, or seek to protect specific industries from global competition. Therefore 
performance assessment might vary across states and across key constituencies. 
Second, given the benchmark or baseline, the next question is how well the defined objective or 
task is achieved. In order to answer this question, we need to focus on the sources of performance. 
Gutner and Thompson (2010) differentiate between internal or external factors to the organization and 
social vs. material factors. Internal factors relate to the delegated means (material) or the bureaucratic 
culture (social) prevalent in the organization. External factors address the degree to which there are 
shared norms (social) or power politics (material) shaping trade policy. These factors all directly or 
indirectly affect overall performance.  
Third, an important question is how performance would have been in the absence of certain 
institutional features and arrangements. Establishing counterfactuals are often a methodological 
challenge to studies on performance (see also Elsig and Cottier 2011). In the past, research has mainly 
relied on comparative case study design to analyze the institutional effects. A prominent example has 
been the analysis of how the WTO dispute settlement system and its forerunner institution (the GATT) 
have dealt with similar tricky cases (Zangl 2008). A special test for the impact of institutions is how 
they perform in hard times. In the case of external shocks such as the economic and financial crises, it 
is important to understand how existing institutions buffer against demands for increased 
protectionism.  
In sum, measuring performance is far from trivial. It is composed of an analysis that first 
establishes the various baselines before mapping and tracing the key sources of performance in order 
to understand causal mechanisms. Finally, it often deals with methodological challenges for 
establishing causality speaking to the need to think carefully about counterfactuals. In the following 
we present three different angles to performance rooted in international relations, economics and legal 
scholarship. 
C. An international relations angle 
Most scholars in the mainstream international relations (IR) tradition consider the role of international 
organizations (IOs) as rather limited. However, institutions created in the trading system have been 
acknowledged as being more influential than institutions in many other policy fields. Already the 
seminal work of Keohane (1984) attributes to the GATT an important function to overcome states’ 
reluctance to cooperate by providing information and helping induce compliance. Later, the WTO was 
excluded explicitly from realist-type skepticism that IOs without enforcement mechanisms are 
inconsequential (Downs et al. 1996). Most realist writings clearly stated that the WTO mattered as an 
institution as it was able to modify its members’ behavior. The realist contributions were focusing 
more on the question who designed the rules and who controls the organization (Gruber 2000). In 
addition, some work has suggested that increased legalization could hurt weaker states (Drezner 
2007). In particular overlapping new legal obligations create a fragmented system which allows larger 
stay to strategically engage in forum-shopping of legal institutions. Power arguments were also tested 
in relation to weak states’ (lack of) participation in the WTO dispute settlement system (Sattler and 
Bernauer 2011, Elsig and Stucki 2012). 
I. So, what is to be achieved? 
In order to discuss the performance of the WTO, we need to start by asking what its purpose is. While 
there are formal objectives listed in the treaties (e.g. in the preamble), these are often not suitable 
baselines for an assessment because they are either too ambitious in the sense of being beyond the 
control or influence of the organization or difficult to operationalize for the purpose of measurement 
(Elsig 2010). Moreover, if we can locate some objectives, these are subject to significant change over 
time and actors’ support for these might weaken or strengthen. For example, the original 1947 GATT 
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agreement did not explicitly mention economic development (e.g. poverty reduction) as a goal to be 
achieved, while environmental concerns were absent as witnessed by the aim of “developing the full 
use of the resources of the world.” Notwithstanding differences of views on objectives and what 
importance they have, the multilateral trading system was created to help increase the international 
exchange of goods (and, following the Uruguay round, trade in services) based on the general 
presumption that lowering barriers to trade increases overall welfare. While the economics literature 
(see below) has focused very much on this dimension, the IR literature has put attention more to 
questions related to how the GATT/WTO institutions have served various political objectives. Below 
we distinguish between macro objectives and micro objectives.  
A group of general objectives which are not core trade objectives, but which are important for the 
stability of the system, could be labelled macro goals. These include:  
First, international institutions are purposefully designed to uphold the “rule of law” which is 
reflected in rules which serve to protect in particular the weaker states and to control the abuse of 
power (Grant and Keohane 2005). This is particularly true for the WTO and its dispute settlement 
system. One of the main incentives to negotiating a highly legalized system to support the 
implementation of new sets of rules was to tame US unilateralism (Elsig and Eckhardt 2015, Pelc 
2010). Therefore, a baseline objective can be derived around a shared understanding held by a large 
group of contracting parties to constrain US unilateralism and to demand the US to use the new 
dispute settlement tools offered by the WTO. 
Second, another potential objective is the ability of multilateral organizations to accommodate new 
powerful states. As some earlier GATT trade rounds were designed to integrate the EC and the 
emerging economies (e.g. Brazil and India) into the multilateral system, the WTO helps to manage 
changing trade power dynamics driven by China’s sustained high growth rates. China joined in 2001 
after having gone through the accession procedures. More recently, WTO Members and Russia agreed 
on Russia’s terms of membership. Integrating these states into the existing system could certainly be 
seen as a major objective for international cooperation. The baseline here could be defined as the new 
entrants playing constructively the game (following the rules and rulings, providing leadership in 
ongoing negotiations). 
Third, good international institutions are those that also work well in times of distress. Or put 
differently, an organization’s contribution to problem-solving could prove particularly important in 
times of crises. In the context of the GATT/WTO system, one can consider the economic and financial 
crises which led to calls by domestic actors for protecting national markets as a particular challenge. 
The question is whether the WTO can mitigate the negative effects that result from increasing 
protectionism.  
Fourth, focusing on the weakest of the system, another potential baseline is to integrate less 
developed countries (LDCs) into the system and provide support in negotiations, dispute settlement, or 
implementation-related matters. For the legitimacy of the WTO (Elsig 2007), it is important to allow 
for differentiated treatment with a view of generating benefits for all WTO members. While LDCs 
were in the past mostly excluded from concessions, more recently LDCs have been called upon to 
engage and take on commitments. The baseline would consist of measuring the success of such 
integration and moving from exclusion to increasing involvement. 
While the above objectives are situated at the macro level and primarily define the success of 
international organizations such as the WTO, one can also consider less ambitious, institutional and 
procedural goals and functions that support the realization of the macro objectives. Four “services” or 
institutional platforms stand out in the context of the WTO: 
First, the simple provision of a negotiation platform where WTO members can regularly meet, 
exchange concessions and explore new regulatory solutions to ongoing challenges. In the end of the 
day, the baseline is the amount of outputs that are generated through these negotiations with notable 
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effects for market liberalization and addressing “disguised” protectionism. Currently, the assessment 
of the outcome of the negotiation platform is straightforward given the lack of real progress on new 
agreements with very few exceptions (e.g. the expansion of the information technology agreements, 
the agreement on trade facilitation). 
Second, an important function relates to regime management activities. In order to support the 
implementation of the agreements, the organization assists through peer reviews, discussion fora and 
the active use of transparency mechanisms. Different tools stand out. One is the “member-driven” 
work in the various Committees which allows for clarification and tabling concerns, learning about 
best practice and can potentially lead to the elaboration of new regulatory initiatives (Lang and Scott 
2009). Another is the Secretariat-driven assessment of national trade policies (e.g. Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism). This activity helps provide more information and could potentially turn into a 
naming and shaming exercise. Overall, the question is how well the system supports the 
implementation of the obligations (1
st
 order compliance) and how Committees may contribute to 
design new initiatives. 
Third, support by the organization to WTO members through its technical assistance and capacity 
building arm. Are we witnessing improvement in Members’ capacity to participate in the system? This 
supports directly the integration of LDCs into the system (macro goal). However, assessing technical 
assistance work is far from straightforward and to our knowledge no field experiments have been 
conducted to isolate the potential impact of the WTO from other factors.
1
  
A fourth function is the provision of ‘affordable’ and equal access to the dispute settlement 
mechanism. Can affected members launch legal proceedings given power asymmetry, lack of direct 
support by stakeholders or lack in legal capacity? These objectives support weaker actors and help 
them integrate into the system. Some research has suggested continued lack of legal capacity (Kim 
2008, Busch et al. 2009) as well as power asymmetry which leads to weak states not launching many 
complaints against more influential states (Elsig and Stucki 2012, Sattler and Bernauer 2011). 
II. Sources of performance 
Whatever the exact macro or micro objective that is studied, an important next step is to attempt to 
locate the key internal and external factors as well as social and material factors that influence 
performance. Which one of these multiple sources is often a function of the aspired objective? More 
salient and politicized goals (or where disagreement among Members on the direction is significant) 
may be more likely affected by material interests and external factors, whereas less contentious 




To provide an example of how these factors come into the picture, let us focus on the stalled 
negotiations. How important are different factors for reaching the objective of concluding the Doha 
Round? A key external factor has been the emergence of a multi-polar trade world which creates a 
larger set of “material” interests that diverge over the Doha outcome. Increased interest competition 
translates into varying expectations about the content of the Round. In other words, while few would 
dispute the importance of wrapping up the round, the “eye of the beholder” problem as to what should 
be “in the package deal” leads to hard bargaining. Internal institutional challenges complicate the 
finding of agreeable solutions. That the decision-making mode is largely based on consensus-decision 
                                                     
1
 It would be interesting to study the effects of participation in training activities by comparing groups that were exposed to 
this „treatment“ and groups that have not participated in training. A major challenge here is to control for other actors’ 
influence on technical assistance and training, as the WTO is just one of many providers of such services. 
2
 However, we can we think of alternative interaction effects, for instance internal and material interests (e.g. the interest of 
bureaucratic power maximization by IO staffers) or external and social factors (e.g. Washington Consensus affecting the 
work of the WTO). 
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making makes the increased heterogeneity of interests more visible and creates an internal collective 
action problem. This “institutional milieu” of the WTO (Elsig 2010) is further complicated by a 
socially constructed internal understanding that this organization does not vote, although the treaty 
would allow to take recourse to voting. Thus, in this example external and material interests are key, 
but the lack of performance can only be fully understood when focusing on internal norms and rules as 
well. 
Collective action problems might in turn loom less large in WTO activities where norms are shared 
and material interests less conflicting. This might explain why WTO Members have agreed on a deal 
at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali on Trade Facilitation. It however might also be a result of 
smart design in which both developed and developing countries expect to reap benefits. 
III. Assessment 
Based on the above conceptualization of performance, the question whether micro goals have been 
achieved cannot be easily answered without more in-depth causal analysis. We certainly witness areas 
of non-performance in relation to the negotiation function of the organization. Here the eye of the 
beholder problem related to the content of treaty outcomes looms large. By contrast, we also observe 
progress in terms of dispute settlement. Few would have expected the WTO dispute settlement system 
to play such a prominent role when it was created (see also Section E below). As to other micro goals, 
such as regime management and technical assistance and capacity building, the assessment is rather 
positive with room for improvement (e.g. using the true potential of committee work).  
If we focus on macro goals, most of these look prima facie as achieved to a large degree. The US 
has taken less recourse to unilateral actions and has been an active user of the dispute settlement 
system. Overall there is little evidence that the system has not moved toward more law (and therefore 
to constrain the abuse of power). The integration of China in terms of dispute settlement seems to have 
worked well in light of avoiding “trade wars”; the leadership role in negotiations might be another 
story. For the integration of Russia, it is too early to make a judgment call. Finally, the system was not 
damaged through the financial and economic crises. Whether this has been a result of careful retention 
by WTO members by not bringing many more new cases or an actual protectionism-taming-effect of 
the WTO’s legal system remains unclear (see Baccini and Kim 2012). A counterfactual method could 
be employed in studying this particular event. 
D. An economics perspective 
Economists approach the question of assessing the objectives and performance of the WTO through a 
variety of lenses. What follows focuses on two dominant viewpoints/approaches. The first centers on 
understanding the rationale for trade agreements – the incentives governments have to cooperate. The 
second lens is primarily empirical, the aim being to assess the effects of WTO membership on 
individual countries and the impact of the organization as a whole. Research in this vein centers on the 
design and results of negotiations aimed at reducing trade distorting policies. The focus is on 
performance in the sense of understanding the economic implications of both what is being (might be) 
negotiated – ex ante analysis – and what has been agreed – ex post analysis.  
Empirical economists have assessed the impact (‘performance’) of the WTO using a range of 
metrics, including the volume (value) of total trade flows, the structure and composition of trade flows 
(e.g., changes in the variety of goods traded; increases in the number of trading partners, etc.) and 
economic welfare (real income). Such empirical research is both “macro” in the sense that it does not 
consider the specifics of any of the rules but simply analyzes whether a “WTO effect” can be 
discerned in the data, and “micro” in the sense that the focus of analysis is on a specific area or set of 
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disciplines – antidumping, agriculture, intellectual property, services, safeguards, technical barriers to 
trade, trade facilitation, the DSU, etc.
3
 Whether ‘macro’ or ‘micro’, it is usually taken as given that 
WTO disciplines and commitments are (have been) implemented and analysis tends to abstract from 
implementation costs in the narrow sense (see e.g., Finger, 2007). 
I. Objectives of WTO Members 
There are two strands of theorizing in the economics literature about the ‘macro’ goals of countries 
that engage in trade agreements. One revolves around the terms of trade: the premise is that countries 
negotiate so as to reduce the negative terms-of-trade effects generated by trade policies of partner 
countries (Johnson, 1953-54; Bagwell and Staiger, 2002).
4
 A consequence of this view of trade 
cooperation is that agreements will (need to) be among countries that can affect their terms of trade. 
Small countries will generally have much less power to affect their terms of trade, although if products 
are differentiated even a small state will have some power to influence them.
5
  
Another strand of the economic literature (e.g., Finger, 1979; Tumlir, 1985; Maggi and Rodriguez-
Clare, 1998; Ethier, 2007) argues that trade agreements permit governments to adopt welfare-
enhancing policies that are not (politically) feasible otherwise. The premise here is that governments 
are conservative in the sense that they put greater weight on prospective losses for groups in society 
than on the expected gains from liberalization. More generally, governments have incentives to 
impose or maintain protection because this raises the incomes of the groups from which they derive 
political support. By committing to certain rules that constrain policy space a government can make its 
reforms more credible: officials can tell interest groups seeking the (re-)imposition of trade policies 
that doing so will violate the nation’s WTO commitments and generate retaliation by trading partners. 
Trade agreements ‘work’ because they change the domestic political economy of trade policy by 
mobilizing export interests to oppose lobbying for protection by import-competing interests because 
they would then lose access to foreign markets. By affecting the balance of political support a more 
liberal trade policy stance becomes optimal.  
The terms-of-trade and commitment-cum-political economy approaches generate clear goal posts 
from a performance perspective: both imply that the outcome of cooperation is a mix of liberalization 
(lower average trade barriers) and rules that constrain the ability to re-impose barriers. The different 
theories also all imply that an effect of the WTO will be to increase trade relative to a counterfactual 
where no agreement had occurred – because of the reduction in barriers and other trade-distorting 
policies, and the reduction in policy uncertainty.  
Views differ on how strong the evidence is for the presumed underlying rationale for trade 
cooperation and this is an active subject of research. However, given that both theories imply that an 
outcome of cooperation is trade liberalization and policy bindings that reduce uncertainty for traders, 
common measures of WTO ‘performance’ include (i) progress in further reducing trade barriers and 
agreeing to new policy disciplines; (ii) the extent to which domestic political economy pressures to re-
impose protection were contained in times of stress and in response to shocks; and more generally (iii) 
                                                     
3
 There is a huge literature on the many different WTO agreements and the effects, both normative and positive, of the 
policy disciplines that are embodied in each agreement. See, for example, the 21 volume series Critical Perspectives on 
the Global Trading System and the WTO (Edward Elgar Publishing) for a collection of what leading scholars regard as 
core contributions on each of the main WTO agreements and activities. 
4
 As such negative externalities can be created by domestic policies as well, the terms of trade theory also offers guidance 
regarding what types of policies could be the subject of multilateral negotiations and cooperation.  
5
 Bagwell and Staiger (2011). Of course, governments of small countries that cannot affect the terms of trade still have an 
interest in being a member of the WTO because exporters will benefit from the tariffs that larger countries negotiate 
reciprocally with one another and then extend to all members under the MFN rule. 
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trade effects—whether the disciplines and operation of the WTO are associated with changes in trade 
and specialization.  
II. Goals and performance of the WTO: Three metrics 
1. Reducing trade barriers and agreeing to new policy disciplines 
The basic stylized fact here is well-known: to date the WTO’s performance in delivering new policy 
commitments has been very weak. This does not require economic analysis, of course, in that no new 
market access agreements were negotiated between 1995 and 2015. The Doha Development Agenda 
has been moribund since 2008 and the large players that historically have been the mainstays of 
multilateral trade cooperation (US and EU) have shifted their main focus to the conclusion of so-called 
mega-regional agreements (TPP, TTIP). Indeed, there has been a general shift towards preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs): some 400 PTAs have been notified to the WTO in the last 20 years. Much 
of the liberalization that has occurred since 1995 has been associated with either unilateral reforms or 
the implementation of PTAs.  
An interesting question is to what extent this is consistent with the ‘macro’ goal of reducing 
barriers to trade. Given that average levels of protection have continued to fall throughout the post-
1995 period, and that the WTO explicitly allows for members to negotiate PTAs, it is not as clear as is 
often argued that the WTO has failed to deliver. It has not proved possible to conclude the Doha 
Round and agree to new rules in areas such as agricultural subsidies, but at the same time governments 
have signed numerous preferential trade agreements and reduced average levels of protection. 
Moreover, it should be recognized that in key areas that economic research suggests will deliver large 
gains for developing countries – most notably trade facilitation (where estimated potential gains 
exceed what was proposed in Doha for reducing tariffs—e.g., Hoekman and Nicita, 2011) – WTO 
members did conclude an agreement.  
2. Managing political economy pressures and preventing backsliding 
Does the WTO improve national trade policy processes and outcomes? Here the answer is largely 
positive, although there is no consensus. At the national level there is evidence of a positive effect of 
the WTO on the ‘quality’ of trade policy. In part this is reflected in the fact that although numerous, 
the number of disputes are much less than what would be predicted based on the number of bilateral 
interactions between countries (Horn et al, 1999; Sattler and Bernauer, 2011). In part this has been 
demonstrated by case studies of specific countries. Examples include the work of Mike Finger and 
coauthors (Bacarat et al. 2013; Finger and Nogues, 2006) showing how WTO disciplines can be and 
have been used to manage and deflect pressures for protection by powerful interest groups.  
One measure of performance on this front is what happened (did not happen) following the 2008 
financial crisis in the US and the EU. In contrast to the late 1970s and early 1980s, the closest recent 
analogue where a major shock (OPEC price rise) sent the global economy into a tailspin, when 
governments imposed a plethora of trade restrictions, including quotas and ‘voluntary’ export 
restrictions, there was not a significant rise in average levels of protection post-2008.
6
 For example, 
Gawande, Hoekman and Cui (2015) find that WTO disciplines were a factor, although they also point 
to changes in the incentives to use trade policy: once countries are highly integrated into international 
production networks they will not benefit from trade protection. But insofar as the rise of global value 
chains was a factor in restraining protectionism, to a significant extent this in itself can also be 
                                                     
6
 While views on this differ among economists – e.g., Evenett and Fritz (2015) argue there has been a significant increase 
in the use of trade-distorting policies – the majority view among economists is that average levels of protection did not 
increase significantly. See e.g., the contributions in Hoekman (2015). 
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attributed to the WTO: the open, rules-based multilateral trading system underpinned the shift by 
companies towards greater specialization, cross-border investment and international production 
networks. Another measure of the performance of the WTO in this area is the absence of a large scale 
increase in disputes alleging violations of WTO commitments post-2008 crisis (see also Section E 
below). As discussed subsequently, one of the ‘micro’ functions that played a supporting role in this 
regard are the WTO’s various transparency mechanisms. 
3. Trade effects of the WTO 
As noted previously, one measure of the attainment of both of the broad macro goals of the WTO that 
are distinguished in the economics literature is whether the WTO has an effect on countries’ trade 
patterns and performance. The most straightforward measure is whether the WTO overall or 
membership of a country in the WTO increases trade volumes and the structure of trade (lower 
barriers and less uncertainty should increase investment in tradables and allow exploitation of 
comparative advantages that will be reflected in changes in specialization).  
The best evidence from a statistical perspective – in terms of identifying a ‘WTO effect’ – comes 
from studies of the effects of WTO accession. Countries that acceded to the WTO after 1995 differ 
from ‘original’ WTO members in that they were forced to go through a rigorous and demanding 
process of review and scrutiny, and were required to do much more to bolster and reform trade policy 
institutions than GATT incumbents. Rose (2005); Subramanian and Wei (2007) and Tang and Wei 
(2009) find a positive trade impact for countries that joined the WTO after 1995. Tang and Wei (2009) 
attribute this positive effect to improved economic governance and argue that WTO accession acts as a 
partial cure for weaknesses in the investment climate in many acceding countries. The mechanisms 
that are at play here span various elements of the WTO, including greater policy certainty associated 
with bindings and transparency. Reducing uncertainty is an important dimension of the WTO and 
trade agreements more generally (see, Francois, 1997; Francois and Martin 2004; Handley 2014 and 
Limão and Tovar 2011). 
There has been debate in the economics literature whether positive trade effects apply more 
generally. Rose (2004), most notably, undertook a gravity model analysis of the determinants of 
bilateral trade flows of GATT/WTO members for a 50 year period and failed to find a distinct impact 
associated with GATT/WTO membership. However, Subramanian and Wei (2007) find that the WTO 
does increase trade – by some 40 percent on average – but only for those countries that participated in 
the process of reciprocal exchange of trade policy commitments. They do not find such a positive 
trade effect for most developing country members of the GATT, which they attribute to the pursuit of 
special and differential treatment which implied that most of these countries did not make changes to 
their trade regimes. Similarly accounting for this selection bias, Liu (2009) and Dutt et al. (2013) find 
a strong role for the WTO in increasing the extensive margin of trade; the latter conclude that WTO 
membership increases the extensive margin by 30 to 40 percent.  
Another example of a WTO agreement that should allow for clear identification of impacts is the 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). This applies to only a subset of countries, thus 
permitting comparisons between signatories and non-signatories. Research finds no effects on the 
import behavior of participating governments. Shingal (2015) analyzes procurement sourcing over 
time in Japan and Switzerland, and finds that GPA membership has no independent effect. Shingal 
(2011) concludes that the share of services contracts awarded to foreigners declined over time for 
these two countries, as opposed to rising. Rickard and Kono (2013) assess the effects of the GPA and 
43 PTAs that include procurement, and conclude the agreements have no impact on foreign sourcing. 
However, here again there may be country-specificity at work. Fronk (2014), focusing only on 
agreements negotiated by the US finds a statistically significant positive effect of bilateral 
procurement agreements on procurement behavior. Thus, while the WTO overall has had the expected 
positive trade impact, this is not the case across the board. 
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III. Sources of Performance 
The determinants of the performance of the WTO in achieving the broad ‘macro’ goals that are the 
focus of economics research are varied. External events – not just events such as the 2008 
crisis/recession or the 1998 East Asian financial meltdown but also major structural changes such as 
the rapid growth sustained by China that led to a major rebalancing of the world economy – clearly are 
a factor, as are decisions by WTO members whether and how to employ outside options to pursue the 
macro goals. The intensity with which WTO members have used PTAs increased in the WTO’s first 
20 years and it is likely that this trend will continue. It is important to consider that the WTO makes 
explicit provisions for the negotiation of PTAs between its members. The WTO membership has a 
choice where and how to pursue trade cooperation. The revealed preference has been to pursue parallel 
tracks: the Doha negotiations and plurilateral initiatives as well as PTAs. Has a proliferation of PTAs 
led to significant trade diversion and negative spillovers for non-members? While the jury is still out 
on this question, empirical economic research suggests that PTAs have not had anywhere near the 
negative effects they might have had and that on balance they have been associated with a general 
trend of greater openness to trade globally.
7
 
PTAs do not address many of the core issues that are of concern to the majority of the WTO 
membership and that are on the table in the DDA – most notably trade-distorting agricultural policies 
and subsidies. They are not a substitute for a comprehensive multilateral agreement that goes beyond 
what was negotiated in the 1990s (the Uruguay Round). An internal factor that many argue plays a 
role in the limited achievements in new rule-making in the WTO is how the negotiating agenda is 
determined and limited scope to adjust this over time. Numerous economic analyses suggest that the 
‘landing zone’ associated with the DDA is both small and perhaps more important, that the 
distribution of associated economic benefits and losses is quite asymmetric (Decreux and Fontagné, 
2015; Laborde and Martin, 2015; Martin and Messerlin, 2007). These are issues where there is 
substantial scope to apply both quantitative modeling and analysis used in other parts of economics 
(e.g., the theory of clubs and fiscal federalism), as well as a clear need for multi-disciplinary research 
strategies to identify areas of complementarity between PTAs, small group cooperation in the WTO, 
and universal membership agreements.  
A function of the WTO that has played an important role in sustaining cooperation – preventing 
backsliding; avoiding disputes – are the various transparency mechanisms. This played a positive role 
in the post-2008 period in raising external visibility of national trade policy measures and signaling 
that actions of governments would be scrutinized. Of course, determining to what extent this led to 
fewer action being taken is difficult to determine – there is no clear counterfactual. This is one subject 
where there is a need for multi-disciplinary analysis, e.g., detailed case studies of deliberation within 
governments and in parliaments. The same is true for assessments of the role that WTO commitments 
and disciplines play in the way that governments respond to pressures from domestic constituencies 
for economic assistance. 
WTO rules, processes and interactions are just one mechanism through which government policy is 
affected. The economic research on the trade and growth effects of the WTO demonstrates that these 
effects may be indirect as well as direct. The indirect channel may well be more important, but 
difficult to identify. Thus, engagement in the WTO may help to stimulate a focus on improving the 
business environment and investment climate more generally. The need to develop a capacity to 
implement agreements and to participate in dispute settlement may have spillover effects in other areas 
– e.g., the negotiation of investment agreements, or a reconsideration of approaches towards non-trade 
economic regulation. The WTO cooperates and interacts more closely with a large number of 
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 In a survey of the empirical literature Freund and Ornelas (2010) conclude that overall PTAs have not had the adverse 
effects that many had expected them to have, such as significant trade diverting effects, because they were associated 
with a period in which countries liberalized more generally. Estevadeordal, Freund and Ornelas (2008) conclude that 
recent vintage PTAs have been accompanied with a reduction in MFN barriers to trade. 
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international agencies and organizations than the GATT did. An example is the work on ‘aid for trade’ 
which has brought the WTO into the ambit of the development community and raised awareness of 
trade capacity needs in the development world. This may well have had significant payoffs in attaining 
‘macro’ goals. Documenting what should be attributed to the operation of the WTO is a difficult 
challenge. 
IV. Assessment 
Space constraints have limited this section to a very selective and partial discussion of the economic 
literature that is relevant to an assessment of the performance of the WTO. However, on balance this 
literature suggests that if the focus is on the three objectives identified above the organization has 
performed relatively well. The evidence indicates that the WTO has generated lower barriers to trade, 
sustained these in times of stress, and generated more trade. Insofar as greater trade is associated with 
higher incomes and a reduction in poverty, the WTO has increased world welfare – which is of course 
the primary high level goal identified in the WTO Preamble. Of course, there are serious attribution 
problems associated with any empirical estimates of how much the WTO has contributed to global 
welfare (see, e.g., Anderson, 2014), and matters are complicated by the fact that the WTO builds on an 
acquis that was negotiated over a long period of time, including the GATT years. Looking forward it 
is clear that future assessments of performance will depend on whether and how WTO members are 
able to multilateralize what they achieve through PTAs and their willingness to do so.  
E. International law perspectives 
In legal scholarship, performance studies have focused on the effectiveness of international courts and 
tribunals or the dispute settlement mechanism set up in the context of certain IOs. With the 
considerable increase in the creation of international courts and tribunals, especially since the 1990s, 
the question of how these international adjudicators have performed has attracted significant attention. 
The puzzle of how international adjudicators can be effective without genuine police or enforcement 
powers remains central. In the WTO, this led to a focus on the performance of WTO dispute 
settlement. 
The predominant approach to assessing the performance of WTO dispute settlement is less than 
satisfactory. Most legal scholars and WTO insiders be it from the WTO secretariat or diplomatic 
missions of WTO member countries have focused on either (i) usage rates, that is, how many disputes 
have been filed at the WTO, or (ii) compliance with adverse rulings issued by WTO panels or the 
Appellate Body (Wilson 2007; Davey 2009; Hughes 2012).  
That usage rates or compliance with court judgements are at best limited proxies for performance 
should, however, be obvious. Indeed, at annual updates on WTO dispute settlement, chairs of the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) have invariably referred to both low and high usage rates as 
evidence of success.
8
 When usage rates are low, the message is that WTO countries comply with WTO 
rules and jurisprudence, so there are no disputes and the system works. When usage rates are high, 
insiders congratulate themselves by stating that a high number of disputes demonstrates trust in, and 
effectiveness of, WTO dispute settlement. Either of these views can be correct (low usage rates, for 
example, can, indeed, be evidence of high levels of compliance, or of complete ineffectiveness or 
unattractiveness of the system) but they cannot be both correct at the same time.  
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 See Reflections from Outgoing Chairs on DSB Developments, 2010-2014, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm#dsb. See also WTO Director-General Azevedo’s statement, in 
reaction to WTO disputes reaching 500 mark: “This shows that the WTO’s dispute settlement system enjoys tremendous 
confidence among the membership, who value it as a fair, effective and efficient mechanism to solve trade problems” 
(WTO 2015).  
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Similarly, there is no doubt that the rate of compliance with adverse WTO rulings by panels and the 
Appellate Body is impressively high (more than 80 %, Davey 2009:119; according to the WTO 
website, “around 90%”, WTO 2015). Still, this alone tells us little, if anything, about overall 
compliance with WTO rules (the WTO disputes actually filed and ruled upon may only be the 
relatively uncontroversial tip of the iceberg of total number of violations out there), nor even about the 
actual compliance pull of WTO rulings (WTO rulings may be complied with because they impose 
relatively low burdens, because losing states see it in their own interest to do so anyhow or for reasons 
external to the WTO such as unilateral threats to pull-back development aid). As Shany puts it, “a low-
aiming court, issuing minimalist remedies, may generate a high level of compliance but have little 
impact on the state of the world” (Shany 2012:227). The European Court of Human Rights, for 
example, boasted until recently about an almost perfect compliance rate. However, once the remedies 
provided became more intrusive -- not just declaratory statements that a violation had occurred or 
relatively conservative monetary compensation, but also orders to reopen faulty legal proceedings or 
to adopt broad legal or policy reforms -- compliance rates significantly declined (Shany 2012:263-4).  
Similarly, high compliance with WTO judgements may be related to the relatively limited remedies 
provided: only prospective compliance in the individual case; no retroactive damages for past harm 
caused or obligation to reform v-à-v all WTO members. Conversely, a certain degree of non-
compliance with WTO judgements does not necessarily reflect badly on WTO performance. As 
Raustiala points out, international rules or rulings “can be effective even if compliance with them is 
low. If a legal standard is quite demanding, even widespread failure to meet it may still correlate with 
observable, desired changes in behavior” (Raustiala 2000:394). Also, less-than-perfect compliance 
may be good rather than bad for the WTO system: It provides an escape valve or limited “exit option” 
for countries to accommodate exceptionally strong political or economic interests. This “exit option” 
in the face of exceptional circumstances may, indeed, explain why WTO members were able to sign 
onto the more legalized WTO dispute settlement system in the first place. Without it, they may also be 
less willing to consent to new agreements (Pauwelyn 2005). On this view, attempting to ratchet up 
compliance levels with WTO rulings to 100% may backfire and harm the system (e.g. certain 
countries may leave the WTO) rather than enhance its performance. 
I. Performance: A new approach  
Non-WTO specific studies on the performance of international courts and tribunals take a more 
structured approach, along the lines we suggest in section B above (establishing the benchmark, 
isolating key sources of performance and thinking hard about potential counterfactuals). 
Rather than focusing on “outputs” such as number of disputes filed or rulings issued, Shany (2012) 
proposes a “goal-based approach” -- assessing “outcomes” rather than “outputs” -- to assess the 
performance of international courts: “in order to measure the effectiveness of an international court 
using this approach, one has to identify the court’s aims or goals—that is, the desired outcomes that it 
ought to generate—and ascertain a reasonable time frame for meeting some or all of these goals” 
(Shany 2012:225). At a minimum, this approach involves “goal identification, outcome assessment 
and establishing causation”. A more comprehensive analysis would “also refer to structural and 
procedural indicators in order the gauge outcomes better and to diagnose root causes for 
underperformance” as well as “the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of specific goal-attainment 
strategies” (Shany 2012:254-5).  
Shany recognizes that an international tribunal may have different goals and distinguishes on the 
basis of their source (goals set by external constituencies v. actors within the system), hierarchical 
level (ultimate ends v. intermediate goals) and method of articulation (goals explicitly identified v. 
implicit or unstated goals). He also identifies four generic goals that most international courts are 
encouraged to achieve: (i) “promoting compliance with the governing international norms (primary 
norm compliance)”, that is, in the WTO context, the enforcement of WTO commitments or seeking 
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compliance by WTO members with WTO norms, not only through disputes filed but also by means of 
changing or influencing state behavior “in the shadow of the law”, (ii) “resolving international 
disputes and specific problems (dispute resolution or problem solving)”, in the WTO sphere, avoiding 
escalating trade wars or settling trade disputes between two specific WTO members, (iii) “contributing 
to the operation of related institutional and normative regimes (regime support)”, in the WTO, for 
example, to contribute to the WTO’s overall goal of trade liberalization, and (iv) “legitimizing 
associated international norms and institutions (regime legitimization)”, in the WTO, to confer 
legitimacy on, for example, the states and government officials that established the WTO or to, more 
broadly, advance the rule of law in international relations.  
Along similar lines, Helfer (2014) identifies four different dimensions of performance of 
international tribunals: (i) “case-specific effectiveness”, a measure closely linked to the level of 
compliance with court rulings, (ii) “erga omnes effectiveness” or the effect of court rulings on the 
behavior of all states subject to the court’s jurisdiction (not just the disputing parties), (iii) 
“embeddedness effectiveness” or “the extent to which [international courts] anchor their judgments in 
domestic legal orders, enabling national actors to remedy potential treaty violations at home and avoid 
the need for international litigation” and (iv) “effectiveness in developing international law” or “norm-
development effectiveness”, that is, how court rulings “contribute to building a body of international 
jurisprudence” (Helfer 2014:466). 
Applying these insights to an assessment of the performance of WTO dispute settlement, five steps 
can be envisaged: (i) goal identification, (ii) measurement, (iii) establishing causation, (iv) assessing 
cost-effectiveness and (v) considering explanations or indicators explaining good or bad performance 
(leading to both diagnosis and cure). 
1. Identification 
On goal identification, it is clear that the DSU may, for different people, have different goals. For 
trade diplomats, the main goal may be the avoidance of escalating trade wars and the settlement of 
trade disputes based on rules rather than economic power (Shany’s “dispute resolution or problem 
solving” function; Helfer’s “case-specific effectiveness”). For private traders, the core goal may rather 
be to enhance market access in foreign countries by efficiently removing WTO inconsistent trade 
barriers (Shany’s “primary norm compliance” and “regime support” functions). For academics and 
international law practitioners, in turn, the main benchmark may be the quality of legal or economic 
reasoning of WTO rulings or the system’s contribution to world trade law or, more broadly, public 
international law (Helfer’s “norm-development effectiveness”). Depending on the goal identified, the 
WTO dispute settlement system may then be highly successful (e.g. in avoiding escalating trade wars, 
achieving compliance with actual court rulings or developing a stable jurisprudence), or deeply 
disappointing (e.g. in swiftly opening foreign markets for private traders, significantly reducing the 
total pool of trade protectionist measures or basing WTO rulings on solid economic evidence or 
reasoning).  
As noted earlier, high levels of compliance with court rulings (“case-specific effectiveness”) does 
not necessarily equate with high levels of overall norm compliance (“primary norm compliance”), see 
also Elsig (2016). In the WTO, for example, it is interesting to note that in the first 20 years (1995-
2014), 488 requests for consultations were filed, leading to 154 panel reports and 96 Appellate Body 
reports; with the majority of disputes settled or not proceeding, only 18 disputes where the remedy of 
retaliation was authorized and close to 90 % compliance with court rulings. Yet, the distribution of 
cases across the different WTO agreements is very uneven: out of 488 requests, 387 invoked GATT, 
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Low usage rates for GATS and TRIPS may indicate high levels of compliance with those 
agreements; it may also point at ineffectiveness of the system in those sectors or reluctance by WTO 
members to enforce commitments in these areas. In any event, the end result is that WTO 
jurisprudence is highly developed in some areas (for example, national treatment and trade remedies) 
but underdeveloped or non-existent in other fields (for example, large parts of GATS and TRIPS, or 
GATT Article XXIV on regional trade agreements). The absence of disputes or jurisprudence under 
GATT Article XXIV is certainly not explained by the absence of free trade agreements. It may be 
explained by compliance by members with the conditions under Article XXIV or, more likely, the 
adage that “people who live in glass houses do not throw stones”, that is, many WTO members may 
violate GATT Article XXIV; hence, they are unlikely to sue another country on the issue for fear of a 
ruling backfiring against themselves.  
WTO dispute settlement may thus perform better in some functions than others (e.g. more “case-
specific effectiveness” than “primary norm compliance”). For one and the same function (“norm-
development effectiveness”), it may perform better in some fields (national treatment) than others 
(GATT Article XXIV). 
When it comes to Helfer’s “embeddedness effectiveness”, for example, there can be little doubt 
that WTO dispute settlement has (predictably) performed rather badly: for lack of direct effect of 
WTO law in the national legal systems of the major trading nations and the absence of any 
requirement to first exhaust domestic remedies before resorting to WTO dispute settlement, domestic 
courts have played almost no role in interpreting and enforcing the WTO treaty. Conversely, to the 
surprise of some, WTO dispute settlement and especially the WTO Appellate Body has played a major 
role in the elaboration and development of not only WTO law but also general principles of public 
international law (e.g. rules on treaty interpretation, burden of proof or good faith), thereby performing 
well in terms of “norm-development effectiveness”.  
Crucial in this respect is to keep in mind also that bad or good performance under a particular 
benchmark is not by definition bad or good normatively speaking. For many WTO insiders or 
diplomats, for example, neither “embeddedness” nor “norm-development” effectiveness is particularly 
desirable. Rather than delegating power to domestic courts or WTO panels and the Appellate Body, 
they may want to keep enforcement and lawmaking powers in their own hands. What is admirable 
norm-development for one person is unacceptable judicial activism for another. For some the DSU is 
there to boost and facilitate the enforcement of WTO commitments, for others, in contrast, it is there to 
limit and control enforcement especially unilateral enforcement by the most powerful countries e.g. by 
putting a cap on authorized retaliation.  
2. Measurement and causation 
Once goals and benchmarks identified and unpacked (step 1), as complex as this may be, the second 
and third steps of measurement and causation are arguably even more difficult. Measuring “primary 
norm compliance” is particularly daunting: How many violations of WTO law are out there and how 
many would there have been “but for” WTO dispute settlement? Past research has worked with 
proxies to get an approximate measure of primary norm compliance, usually not going beyond single 
country studies (e.g. Davis 2012 on the US). These studies rely on government reports which list 
questionable import and behind-the-border measures imposed by trading partners (see Elsig 2016).
10
 
Gauging “case-specific effectiveness” may be easier: Of all trade disputes raised, how many are 
effectively resolved thanks to WTO dispute settlement? However, even there causation may be 
problematic: How does one demonstrate that a country withdrew its trade restriction, settled a case or 
complied with a WTO ruling because of WTO dispute settlement and not because of factors external 
to the WTO such as a change in government in the defendant country or military or development aid 
                                                     
10
 See also de Bièvre (2015). 
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threats uttered by the complainant? Comparisons between WTO dispute settlement and its predecessor 
under the GATT or other international tribunals can be useful but have limits (see Zangl 2008). 
Pointing out that over the same period of time more cases have been filed to the WTO than the GATT 
(500 requests for consultations in the WTO in little more than 20 years compared to 300 disputes over 
a period of 47 years of GATT, WTO 2015) does not necessarily mean that the WTO performed better. 
As discussed earlier, more cases may be due to more norm violations out there (hence a lower level of 
“primary norm compliance”). The WTO may also have more cases than the GATT or the International 
Court of Justice because more countries fall under its compulsory jurisdiction or the WTO covers a 
broader set of issues.  
3. Cost-effectiveness 
Cost-effectiveness is particularly important but often overlooked. It may well be that WTO dispute 
settlement is effective in settling trade disputes or maybe even in substantially changing state behavior 
away from trade protectionism. However, is WTO dispute settlement the most cost-effective means to 
achieve whatever results found as compared, for example, to peer review monitoring or softer, more 
collaborative mechanisms of ensuring implementation? The “cost” related to WTO dispute settlement 
not only consists of time, human resources and money spent on channeling a case through the 
increasingly complex stages of the system (time, resources and money which cannot therefore be spent 
on other matters). Other costs may be trade or broader political frictions or stalemates created by 
legalizing trade disputes with a binary win or lose outcome, or the fact that a compulsory and 
automatic DSU has made it more difficult to conclude new trade liberalizing agreements since the 
DSU’s creation in 1995. If so, the benefits of enhanced enforcement of (some parts of) the 1995 
Uruguay Round agreements thanks to the DSU must be weighed against the costs of legalization 
including not seeing substantial new trade liberalization at the WTO since the WTO’s creation. 
Crucially, this cost-benefit analysis may be positive or in favor of the DSU for some agreements or 
some types of norms (say, national treatment) but negative for others (e.g. trade facilitation 
commitments where breach occurs less because of strategic defection but rather due to a lack of 
resources so that collaborative methods may be more cost-effective than legal enforcement backed up 
by trade retaliation).  
4. Indicators for (good or bad) performance 
Finally, the last step goes beyond the descriptive of measuring the effect and comparing the costs and 
benefits of WTO dispute settlement. Taking a more normative turn, the focus turns to explanations or 
indicators that may explain good or bad performance under one or more goals, for one or more 
agreements or rules. This can lead to both a diagnosis of existing problems and suggestions for reform. 
Shany lists both “structural indicators” and “processes employed by international courts” that may be 
outcome predictors for a court’s performance (Shany 2012). These are mostly internal material factors 
and include legal powers, personnel capacity, resources and structural independence. Relevant process 
features are access to justice, participation of stakeholders, transparency and costs.  
Judicial independence as a driver of court effectiveness has been particularly controversial. Posner 
and Yo (2005) have argued that “independence prevents international tribunals from being effective” 
as they “can render decisions that conflict with the interests of state parties” and make states “reluctant 
to use international tribunals unless they have control over the judges”. Helfer and Slaughter (1997), in 
contrast, argue that the most effective tribunals are independent ones. The truth is probably somewhere 
in between and depends on the particular benchmark or court function looked at. Especially if one 
defines independent tribunals, as Posner and Yo do, as tribunals where “the judges are appointed in 
advance of any particular dispute and serve fixed terms » (think of the International Court of Justice, 
International Criminal Court or the WTO Appellate Body) -- as opposed to dependent tribunals which 
have judges that « are appointed by the state parties for the purpose of resolving a particular dispute » 
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such as the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, Investor-State arbitration tribunals or GATT/WTO panellists – 
independent tribunals are more likely to perform well in terms of “norm-development effectiveness” 
and “regime legitimization”; dependent tribunals may perform better on the scale of resolving specific 
disputes between two parties (“case-specific effectiveness”). Since party-appointed adjudicators 
deciding one specific dispute (dependent tribunals) may be more closely attuned to the interests of the 
disputing parties, unburdened by broader systemic concerns, they may, indeed, be better situated to 
facilitate a judicial outcome palatable for the parties in dispute. However, case-specific effectiveness 
may then be achieved at the expensive of other court functions or goals. All depends, once again, on 
goal identification. 
Beyond independence, Helfer and Slaughter (1997) list another 12 material and social factors that, 
in their view, enhance the performance of supranational adjudication, distinguishing between factors 
within the control of states (such as the composition of the tribunal or functional or fact-finding 
capacity of the court), factors within the control of judges themselves (such as awareness of audience, 
incrementalism and quality of legal reasoning) and factors outside the control of either states or judges 
(such as relative cultural and political homogeneity of states subject to the court).  
II. Assessment 
Legal scholarship on WTO performance has focused on WTO dispute settlement. Too often, however, 
commentators have wrongly fixated on usage rates (500 requests for consultations in little more than 
20 years; hard to say whether this is high or low without knowing the total number of WTO violations 
in place) or compliance with WTO panel or Appellate Body rulings (at around 90% very high, but 
saying little about causation or primary norm compliance). A better approach consists of (i) goal 
identification; (ii) measurement; (iii) establishing causation; (iv) assessing cost-effectiveness; and (v) 
considering explanations or indicators explaining good or bad performance. In this light, the WTO has 
performed better for some goals (resolving specific disputes, developing case law) as compared to 
others (primary norm compliance, promptly offering market access to traders). In addition, the jury 
remains out on whether these achievements are cost-effective or could have been reached by other 
means (e.g. transparency, peer review or more collaborative methods) at lower cost. Finally, one factor 
explaining the WTO’s good performance on some benchmarks is likely the “dependence” of WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body on WTO members, the fact that WTO adjudicators are jointly 
appointed by WTO members and the close interaction between WTO dispute settlement and WTO 
membership control.  
F. Conclusion 
The foregoing has focused on dimensions of the performance of the WTO as an organization from 
different disciplinary perspectives. Below we summarize key objectives that have emerged from our 
discussion that the WTO has been asked to perform (Table 1). What we observe is that the eye of the 
beholder problem is further accentuated as the baselines vary across disciplines. However, some 
objectives, such as the performance during crises and the role of the WTO as an ‘anchor’ for national 
trade policies is of interest to both economics and IR. These two fields also share an interest in the 
operation of specific ‘micro goals’ or functions of the WTO – an example is the impact of the various 
transparency mechanisms that have been established by the WTO membership and specific 
transparency-related functions that have been delegated to the Secretariat. Finally, all three disciplines 
have focused on the operation of the dispute settlement system – perhaps the only function of the 
WTO where this is clearly the case. This is an area where there has been a substantial amount of joint 
research undertaken by legal scholars and economists, as exemplified by the long-running project 
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initiated by Henrik Horn and Petros Mavroidis in 2001 to assess the WTO case law on an annual basis 
through a law and economics lens.
11
 
Two important take-away points can be distilled: First, the literature in all three fields is vibrant. 
There are a variety of objectives discussed and many conceptual and methodological tools offered to 
study WTO performance. International law mainly focuses on the degree of compliance with legal 
norms or dispute rulings, the way these can be applied domestically and how the case-law develops in 
ways that are consistent towards building a body of law. Research so far has not sufficiently engaged 
with social scientific ways to measure performance or effectiveness in more systematic ways. 
International relations puts most attention to how the institution (understood broadly) facilitates 
international cooperation and constrains powerful actors. There is an often implicit underlying 
assumption that for a system to work it has to contain unilateral action against trading partners and 
help to integrate weaker states into the system. Finally, not surprisingly the economic literature has 
focused most directly on the economic impacts of the WTO. While some of the economics literature 
has been focused on big conceptual questions about why trade agreements exist in the first place, there 
is an extensive literature that seeks to gauge both ‘macro’ goals and ‘micro’ objectives and functions.12  
Table 1: Disciplinary objectives 
Discipline Key Objectives 
IR Rule of law against abuse of power 
IR Integrating emerging powers 
IR Performance in times of distress 
IR LDC Integration 
IR Enforcement/dispute settlement/compliance 
Economics Reducing trade barriers and agreeing to policy disciplines 
Economics Avoiding protectionism during economic crises 
Economics Increasing trade, integration and specialization 
Economics Enforcement of commitments 
IL Case-specific compliance 
IL Primary norm compliance 
IL Embeddedness effectiveness – direct effect 
IL Norm development 
Note: Fields with grey shading are objectives that overlap across disciplines. 
Second, different discursive tools have developed within the three disciplines. While similar 
phenomena are captured and assumptions shared, these concepts might work with very different 
connotations and labels. This at times makes cross-disciplinary debate less efficient and may at times 
prohibit it altogether. However, it also exposes the potential for cross-fertilization: it may support the 
legal field to further embrace empirical analysis, and assist economics to broaden its (sometimes) 
narrow focus on welfare analysis and related performance indicators. Finally, IR may serve more than 
in the past as a bridging function between IL and economics, bringing the politics more to the 
forefront of analyses of international cooperation. 
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12
 As mentioned, the extensive economics literature dealing with the effects of specific WTO agreements and disciplines 
could not be discussed in this paper due to space constraints. 
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To conclude, overall the WTO performance cannot be reduced to single indicators. A more holistic 
approach allows understanding the multitude of objectives an organization such as the WTO can serve 
and also sends a warning signal to having unrealistic expectations about the role of international 
institutions. At the same time sources for good or bad performance need to be exposed. Such an 
approach might in particular help policy-makers to better understand the limited effects of 
organizations they create. 
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